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Rule Governing Use Of Lng Flexible Hose Transfer


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#1 LNG Fans

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Posted 07 July 2010 - 09:35 PM

Hello,

Does anybody has the rule governing the LNG flexible hose transfer. What I know EN1474, ICS/OCIMF/SIGTTO, NFPA59A, OCIMF...?

What I want is the rule govern the specific handling of ERC upon emergency release, I mean is there any clear write up how to handle the ERC, what movement needed for mechanical handling?

I'm doing the mechanical handling for LNG hose transfer, so I need to know what's the rule to govern the mechanical handling of the flexible hose LNG transfer system....


Please help...its very important for me

#2 kkala

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Posted 18 July 2010 - 11:35 AM

Can you clarify the ERC (emergency release condition?) more? Is it that LNG is transfered from ship-to-tank through a flexible metallic hose and then the ship suddenly moves away (due to fire, etc)? Or does it concern something else?

#3 Art Montemayor

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Posted 18 July 2010 - 02:13 PM


LNG Fans:

Kkala is correct. We need a more detailed explanation in order to furnish a direct and meaningful response to what is considered as a very serious and important subject in the LNG industry.

I know the application well. In July 1979, exactly 31 years ago, I participated in an emergency and vital operation that succeeded in transferring 125,000 m3 of LNG from one LNG carrier ship to another – while one was fully loaded and severely damaged after going aground at the mouth of the Bay of Algeciras, Spain (next to the rock of Gibraltar) and the other, sister ship, was empty. It was a pioneering and dangerous event that required us to produce successful results in order to avoid an immense tragedy of world proportions. I worked for El Paso LNG Corp. and the damaged ship was the El Paso Paul Kaiser, a magnificent LNG carrier that was on the Algeria – Cove Point LNG trade route at the time. The ship’s capacity was 125,000 m3 of LNG cargo. We had a fleet of nine (9) carriers for this trade route and each had the same capacity. El Paso was the first company to put together a project of this size and magnitude in the early 1970’s. All previous LNG projects prior to this were minuscule compared to ours. No one, at the time, would have reasonably and seriously contemplated employing flexible hoses for LNG transfer – from ship-to-shore, and much less from ship-to-ship. Nevertheless, El Paso was a very serious and determined company that was not only ultra-safety conscious, but was led by a forward-thinking and very serious management team that was well-aware of how to always be prepared – even for the un-thinkable.

The un-thinkable happened on the night of June 29, 1979, 11 pm Houston time. That was when I received the phone call that all engineers dread to think about. I reported to corporate headquarters where our rescue team was to assemble and receive instructions to carry out what we had simulated and practiced in prior preparations and exercises – but what we all thought would never occur or be needed. I took off the next morning on a company jet bound for Malaga, Spain. We established a war room within the Hotel Reina Cristina in Algeciras and we succeeded in bringing in the damaged carrier into Algeciras Bay for an LNG transfer. The Paul Kaiser was not sea worthy as a result of the grounding and any further movement would have ruptured her containment system and caused a disastrous LNG spill dangerous to surrounding human life.

Our problem was that the proposed operation had never even been attempted before. The opposing movements of both ships were well known and the suspected fragile nature of flexible hoses was something we didn’t want to put to a test. But we had no other choice. We imported flexible stainless steel hoses from Houston in our corporate jets and connected the unloading pumps to the sister ship’s loading manifold, laying the flexible hoses on the carbon steel deck of both ships. We were well aware of the potential danger of serious damage to the carbon steel if -260 oF and monitored the hoses and the connections 100% of the time. A leak or spill would have been disastrous.

Our management team participated directly in putting the hoses together, pumping, controlling, and monitoring the operations. This included even vice-presidents in the company. (I wonder how many VPs in companies today would demonstrate that kind of responsibility and guts?)

All tools employed were non-sparking (mainly brass) and we suited up in special uniforms – void of any sparking or static electricity generation. We all communicated verbally, face-to-face. Remember, this was long before cell phone, lap tops, or other sophisticated communications systems. We employed ½” plywood panels (that we also imported by air) to place on the carbon steel decks in order to help reduce any direct contact with the steel decks. We imported special flexible bumpers to place between both ships. Our rescue team carried out the entire operation. No ship crew participated.

The operation was a success. All of the cargo was successfully trans-loaded and not a drop was spilled. A full industry report was delivered at an LNG Conference about a year later. Up to that time, no one outside of the direct people involved were aware of this ever happening. Later, as I recall, a similar incident occurred in the Indonesian-Japan LNG trade and I understand they were also successful. I don’t know if the El Paso experience was used to train for that event, but certainly the Indonesians knew, by that time, of our experience.

My point in recounting the above is not to give a history lesson, but rather to demonstrate that the flexible hose has, indeed, been used long ago for the purpose of transferring LNG. However, I use this example to point out the engineering circumstances under which that application was decided upon and undertaken. I would not – even in today’s world of presumed, perfected engineering operations – recommend employing flexible hoses for LNG transfer in everyday operations. I will not go into the engineering details of what tradeoffs are involved in such operations here. Suffice it to state that you must have a supported and justifiable reason for proposing such an operation.

I know of no “rules” or regulations that cover the use of flexible hoses in LNG transfer. I don’t know what country or legal body you are working under, so there may be some regulations in your country. None exist, to my knowledge, in the USA. I could be mistaken and would solicit any corrections if a reader knows of any.

I hope this experience helps.





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